Envy-free Matchings in Bipartite Graphs and their Applications to Fair
  Division by Aigner-Horev, Elad & Segal-Halevi, Erel
1Envy-free Matchings in Bipartite Graphs and their Applications to
Fair Division
ELAD AIGNER-HOREV and EREL SEGAL-HALEVI, Ariel University
A matching in a bipartite graph G := (X Û∪Y ,E) is said to be envy-free if no unmatched vertex in X is adjacent
to a mathced vertex in Y . Every perfect matching is envy-free, but envy-free matchings may exist even when
perfect matchings do not.
We provide a polynomial-time algorithm for nding an envy-free matching of maximum cardinality. For
edge-weighted bipartite graphs, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for nding a maximum-cardinality
envy-free matching of minimum weight.
We show how envy-free matchings can be used in various fair division problems with either continuous
resources (“cakes”) or discrete ones. In particular, we show a symmetric algorithm for proportional cake-cuing,
and an algorithm for 1-out-of-(2n − 2) maximin-share allocation of discrete objects among n agents.
CCS Concepts: •eory of computation→ Design and analysis of algorithms;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Fair division, Envy freeness, Bipartite Graphs, Maximum Matching
ACM Reference format:
Elad Aigner-Horev and Erel Segal-Halevi. . Envy-free Matchings in Bipartite Graphs and their Applications to
Fair Division. 1, 1, Article 1 (January ), 20 pages.
DOI:
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Erel acknowledges Zur Luria (Luria 2013), who rst provided an existential proof to Corollary
1.4(c). Erel also acknowledges instructive answers by Yuval Filmus, omas Klimpel and bof in
MathOverow.com, and helpful comments by two anonymous referees to the WTAF 2019 workshop.
. XXXX-XXXX//1-ART1 $15.00
DOI:
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January .
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
09
52
7v
3 
 [c
s.D
S]
  1
5 S
ep
 20
19
Envy-free Matchings in Bipartite Graphs and their Applications to Fair Division 1:1
X
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(b) Odd path
(c) Y -path-saturated graph
(a) Non-empty
envy-free matching
X0 X1 X2
Y1 Y2
Fig. 1. (a) this graph has no X -saturating matching, but it has a nonempty envy-free matching (bold).
(b), (c) in these graphs, the only envy-free matching is empty.
1 INTRODUCTION
Let G := (X Û∪Y ,E) be a bipartite graph. A matching M ⊆ E is called perfect if every vertex of X Û∪Y
is adjacent to exactly one edge of M ; it is called X -saturating if every vertex of X is adjacent to
exactly one edge of M . is paper studies the following relaxation of X -saturated matching (where
XM and YM denote the vertices of X and Y , respectively, saturated by M).
Denition 1.1. Let G := (X Û∪Y ,E) be a bipartite graph. A matching M ⊆ E is said to be envy-free
w.r.t. X if no vertex in X \ XM is adjacent to any vertex in YM .
One may view X as a set of people and Y as a set of houses, where a person in X is adjacent
to all houses in Y which he or she likes. A matching M ⊆ E denotes an assignment of houses to
people who like them. roughout the paper, all envy-free matchings are taken w.r.t. X . In such a
matching, an unmatched person x ∈ X \ XM does not envy any matched person x ′ ∈ XM , because
x does not like any matched house y ′ ∈ YM anyway.
If a matchingM isX -saturating, thenXM = X , andM is clearly envy-free. However, many graphs
do not admit an X -saturating matching, yet admit a nonempty envy-free matching; see Figure
1(a). In some graphs, the only envy-free matching is the empty matching ∅ (which is vacuously
envy-free). A natural example is an odd path — a path with 2k + 1 vertice, for some k ≥ 1 — where
X is identied with the larger class in the bipartition; see Figure 1(b).
ese examples invoke the question of whether a given graph admits a nonempty envy-free
matching, and moreover, what is a maximum-cardinality envy-free matching in a given graph?
1.1 Theoretic aspects: envy-free matching and graph structure
We answer these questions by proving a structure theorem for bipartite graphs. We prove that in
every bipartite graph, there is a unique partition of the vertices into two subsets — “good” and
“bad”: the “good” subset is X -saturated (and thus contains the largest possible envy-free matching),
while the “bad” subset has a structure similar to an odd path (and thus contains only an empty
envy-free matching). e structure of this “bad” subset is dened formally below.
Denition 1.2. A bipartite graph G := (X Û∪Y ,E) is called Y -path-saturated if, for some k ≥ 1,
there exist partitions X = X0 Û∪ · · · Û∪Xk and Y = Y1 Û∪ · · · Û∪Yk where for all i ≥ 1:
• ere is a perfect matching between vertices of Xi and vertices of Yi ;
• Every vertex in Yi is adjacent to some vertex in Xi−1.
Every odd path with |X | > |Y |, as in Figure 1(b), is Y -path-saturated. Figure 1(c) shows another
example of a Y -path-saturated graph; it can be seen that the structure of such a graph resembles
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that of an odd path.1 It can also be proved that, in a Y -path-saturated graph, just like in an odd
path, the only envy-free matching is ∅. us the X -saturated graphs and the Y -path-saturated
graphs are two extreme cases. Our rst result is that these two extremes are the building-blocks
of all bipartite graphs. Below, G[X ′,Y ′] denotes the subgraph of G induced by the vertices X ′ Û∪Y ′.
e number of vertices in the smaller side of G is denoted by n := min(|X |, |Y |), and the number of
edges is denoted bym := |E |.
Theorem 1.3. Every bipartite graph G = (X Û∪Y ,E) admits unique partitions X = XS Û∪XL and
Y = YS Û∪YL satisfying the following three conditions:
(a) ere are no edges between XS and YL ;
(b) e subgraph G[XS ,YS ] is Y -path-saturated;
(c) e subgraph G[XL,YL] is X -saturated.
ese partitions can be found within O(m√n) time. Moreover:
(d) e subgraph G[XL,YL] admits a matching saturating XL , and this matching is envy-free in G.
(e) Every envy-free matching in G is contained in G[XL,YL].
For example, in Figure 1(a), G[XS ,YS ] contains the two lemost edges and G[XL,YL] contains
the rightmost (bold) edge, and there is one more edge between XL and YS . In Figures 1(b,c), the
entire graph is G[XS ,YS ], while G[XL,YL] is empty. In an X -saturated graph, the entire graph is
G[XL,YL], while G[XS ,YS ] is empty.
As a corollary of eorem 1.3, one gets several useful conditions on a graph G admiing a
nonempty envy-free matching. e rst condition is necessary and sucient; the other two are
only sucient. Below, NG (X ′) denotes the neighborhood of a subset X ′ ⊆ X in G, i.e.: NG (X ′) :=
{y ′ ∈ Y : ∃x ′ ∈ X ′ such that (x ′,y ′) ∈ E}.
Corollary 1.4. A bipartite graph G := (X Û∪Y ,E) admits a nonempty envy-free matching —
(a) if and only if the bipartite graph (X Û∪NG (X ),E) is not Y -path-saturated;
(b) if G admits no matching saturating NG (X );
(c) if |NG (X )| ≥ |X | ≥ 1.
Corollary 1.4(a) is interesting since it shows that all the “bad” graphs (graphs with no nonempty
envy-free matching) are a generalisation of the odd-path example.
Compare Corollary 1.4(c) with Hall’s theorem (Hall 1934), which says that if (and only if)
|NG (X ′)| ≥ |X ′ | for any subset X ′ ⊆ X , then G admits an X -saturating matching. e strong
condition of Hall is sucient for the strong property of having an X -saturating matching; the
weaker condition (c) is sucient for the weaker property of having a nonempty envy-free matching.
e structure theorem and its corollary are proved in Section 2.
Once all envy-free matchings are “captured” within a specic subgraph, various optimisation
problems on them can be easily solved.
Theorem 1.5. Given a bipartite graph G = (X Û∪Y ,E),
(a) An envy-free matching of maximum cardinality in G can be found within O(m√n) time.
(b) If G is endowed with an edge weight function w : E → R≥0, then an envy-free matching of
maximum cardinality and minimum total weight can be found within O(mn + n2 logn) time.
e algorithms are presented in Section 3.
1 Note that the empty graph is Y -path-saturated (where Xi = Yj = ∅ for all i ≥ 0, j ≥ 1). Also note that a Y -path-saturated
graph may have isolated vertices (vertices with degree 0) in X — such vertices are contained in X0.
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1.2 Practical aspects: envy-free matching in fair division
A fair division problem is a problem of allocating resources among people with dierent preferences,
such that each person conceives his/her share as “fair” according to a pre-specied fairness criterion.
e algorithms of eorem 1.5 directly solve two variants of a problem known as fair house
assignment. In this problem, the resources are indivisible, each agent must get at most a single
resource, and the fairness criterion is envy-freeness. Part (a) solves a variant in which the goal is to
maximise the number of agents assigned a house that they like, subject to envy-freeness. Part (b)
solves a variant in which each assignment of an agent to a house has a certain cost for society (e.g.
the cost of building the house or of moving the agent to the house), and the goal is to minimise
the total cost of the assignment, subject to envy-freeness and maximising the number of assigned
agents. In all variants, it is allowed to leave some houses unallocated.
Interestingly, the same algorithms, combined with Corollary 1.4, can be used as subroutines in
algorithms for various other fair division problems, both of divisible and of indivisible resources,
in which all resources must be allocated. Each of these problems requires its own notation and
denitions. e formal denitions are postponed to Section 4; below results are presented informally.
For a divisible resource (“cake”), we focus on a fairness criterion called proportionality, which
means that each agent must get a piece worth for it at least a fraction 1/n of the total cake value.
ere are various algorithms for proportional cake division, but most of them are not symmetric —
the same agent might get a dierent value when playing rst vs. playing second. is may lead
to quarrels regarding who will play rst. Che`ze (2018) presented an exponential-time symmetric
algorithm for proportional cake division, and asked whether a polynomial-time algorithm exists.
e following theorem answers his question.
Theorem 1.6. ere is a symmetric and polynomial-time algorithm that, given a divisible resource
(“cake”) and n agents with additive valuations over subsets of the cake, partitions the entire cake
among the agents, such that the value of each agent is at least 1/n of the total cake value.
For indivisible objects, we focus on a fairness criterion called 1-out-of-k maximin-share, which
means that each agent weakly prefers its allocated bundle over the outcome of partitioning the
objects into k subsets and geing the worst subset. Procaccia and Wang (2014) proved that a 1-out-
of-n maximin-share allocation may not exist for n ≥ 3 agents, and asked whether a 1-out-of-(n + 1)
maximin-share allocation exists. e following theorem makes a step towards an answer.
Theorem 1.7. Given a set of indivisible objects, and n agents with additive valuations over the
objects, there is a protocol that partitions all the objects among the agents, such that the value of each
agent is at least its 1-out-of-(2n − 2) maximin-share.
e same algorithm may allow each agent to choose between dierent related fairness criteria,
such as 2-out-of-(3n−2)maximin-share, 2/3-fraction maximin-share, etc. (see Section 4 for details).
us, the main contribution of this paper lies not in solving a specic fair division problem, but
rather in presenting a tool — envy-free matching — that can be applied as a subroutine in various
kinds of fair division problems.
Some open questions for future work are presented in Section 5.
2 ENVY-FREE MATCHINGS AND STRUCTURE OF GRAPHS
is section proves eorem 1.3 regarding the structure of bipartite graphs. e main technical
tool used is the alternating sequence.
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X0 X1 X2
Y1 Y2
XS
YS
XL
YL
Fig. 2. A maximalM-alternating sequence S(M,X0) and the induced partitions.
The heavy vertical edges are edges of the underlying matching M . The heavy diagonal edges are edges of
G \M used in constructing the alternating sequence. The light diagonal (gray) edges are edges of G \M not
used in the construction.
Denition 2.1. Let M be a matching in a bipartite graphG := (X Û∪Y ,E). Let X0 ⊂ X be a subset of
vertices unmatched byM . AnM-alternating sequence starting atX0 is a sequence of pairwise-disjoint
subsets of vertices X0 − Y1 − X1 − Y2 − X2 − · · · where for each i ≥ 1:2
• Yi = NG\M (Xi−1) \ (∪j<iYj );
• Xi = NM (Yi ).
Given M and X0, an M-alternating sequence starting at X0 can be easily constructed in linear
time. Since the graph is nite, this construction eventually yields an empty subset — either Xi or
Yi for some i . Denote by S(M,X0) the maximal M-alternating sequence starting at X0 and ending
before the rst ∅. is S(M,X0) induces a partition of the graph as follows (See Figure 2):
• X = XS Û∪XL , where XS := ∪i≥0Xi = the vertices of X participating in the sequence, and
XL := X \ XS = the Leover vertices.
• Y = YS Û∪YL , where YS := ∪i≥1Yi and YL := Y \ YS .
When M has maximum cardinality, its alternating sequences have some useful properties.3
Lemma 2.2. Let M be a maximum-cardinality matching in G = (X Û∪Y ,E) and X0 the subset of
X unmatched by M . Consider the partitions X = XS Û∪XL and Y = YS Û∪YL induced by the maximal
alternating sequence S(M,X0). en:
(a) ere are no edges between XS and YL ;
(b) e subgraph G[XS ,YS ] is Y -path-saturated;
(c) e subgraph G[XL,YL] is X -saturated.
Proof. Part (a). By construction, the set YS is exactly the set of neighbors of XS in G.
Part (b). We rst prove that M[XS ,YS ] — the subset of M contained in G[XS ,YS ] — saturates YS .
Indeed, if, for some i ≥ 1, some vertex yi ∈ Yi were unmatched by M , then an M-augmenting path
could be traced along the edges used in the construction ofS(M,X0), namely: yi−Xi−1−Yi−1−· · ·−X0,
2 e M -alternating sequence is closely related to the M -alternating path — a sequence of vertices x0 − y1 − x1 − ... where
each even edge is in M and each odd edge is not in M (or vice versa). e dierence is that the elements in an M -alternating
sequence are subsets of vertices rather than single vertices.
3 e vertices of XL are exactly the vertiecs of X that are unreachable from X0 in M -alternating paths. us XL is
reminiscent of the “unreachable” set in the Dulmage-Mendelsohn decomposition (Irving et al. 2006; Pulleyblank 1995).
However, the reachability in the Dulmage-Mendelsohn decomposition is from the set of all unsaturated vertices, while the
reachability in our case is only from X0 — the set of unsaturated vertices in X .
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where the last vertex is unmatched. is would contradict the maximality of M . Hence, all vertices
of ∪i≥1Yi = YS are matched by M . By construction, the set of their matches in M is ∪i≥1Xi ⊆ XS .
is implies that the construction of S(M,X0) ends at the X side, i.e., it ends at Xk for some
k ≥ 0. Now, the partitions XS = X0 Û∪ · · · Û∪Xk and YS = Y1 Û∪ · · · Û∪Yk satisfy the denition of a
Y -path-saturated graph (Denition 1.2): for every i ≥ 1, every vertex in Yi is adjacent to some
vertex in Xi−1, and there is a perfect matching between Xi and Yi (along edges of M).
Part (c). We prove that M[XL,YL] — the subset of M contained in G[XL,YL] — saturates XL .
Indeed, By the lemma assumption, all vertices of X unmatched by M are contained in X0 ⊆ XS , so
all vertices of XL are matched by M . By construction, they must be matched to vertices not in any
Yi , so their matches must all lie inside YL . 
Note that, in the special case in which G is X -saturated, the maximum matching M saturates X ,
so X0 is empty and so the M-alternating sequence is empty. In this case, XL = X and YL = Y .
e following lemma relates the three properties (a),(b),(c) above to envy-free matchings.
Lemma 2.3. Let G = (X Û∪Y ,E), and consider any partitions X = XS Û∪XL and Y = YS Û∪YL satisfying
properties (a), (b) and (c) of Lemma 2.2. en:
(d) e subgraph G[XL,YL] admits a matching saturating XL , and this matching is envy-free in G.
(e) Every envy-free matching in G is contained in G[XL,YL].
Note that Lemma 2.3 does not refer to any particular matching M — it holds for any partitions of
X and Y that satisfy the properties (a),(b),(c) above.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.
Part (d). By property (c), G[XL,YL] admits a matching saturating XL . Denote this matching by
W . SinceW saturates XL , no vertex of XL is envious. By property (a), there are no edges between
XS and YL . Since only vertices of YL are matched by W , no vertex of XS is envious. Hence, no
vertex of X is envious, soW is an envy-free matching in G.
Part (e). LetW be any envy-free matching in G . Let XSW := XS ∩V (W ) and YSW := YS ∩V (W ).
We have to prove that both XSW and YSW are empty. By property (a), vertices of XSW can only be
matched to vertices of YSW , so it is sucient to prove that YSW is empty.
e proof is by a counting argument. Let kSW := |YSW | and assume by contradiction that
kSW > 0.
By property (b), the graph G[XS ,YS ] is Y -path-saturated; denote the partitions appearing in
Denition 1.2 by XS = X0 Û∪ · · · Û∪Xk and YS = Y1 Û∪ · · · Û∪Yk . Let i ≥ 1 be the smallest index such that
a vertex of Yi is matched byW , so that YSW ⊆ ∪j≥iYj . By Denition 1.2, all vertices of YSW are
perfectly matched to vertices of ∪j≥iX j ; denote their matches by X ′SW . Note that |X ′SW | = kSW .
Every vertex x ∈ X ′SW is adjacent (along an edge of the perfect matching) to a vertex of YSW , which
is saturated byW . To ensure that x is not envious, x must be saturated byW too.
Let y ′ be a vertex in Yi ∩ YSW . By Denition 1.2, it is adjacent to some vertex x ′ ∈ Xi−1. To
ensure that x ′ is not envious, x ′ must be saturated byW too. But x ′ < X ′SW since X
′
SW ⊆ ∪j≥iX j .
Hence, there must be at least kSW + 1 vertices of XS that are saturated byW : the kSW vertices of
X ′SW , plus the vertex x
′ which is not in X ′SW . But this is a contradiction, since vertices of XS can be
matched only to vertices of YS , and only kSW vertices of YS are matched byW . 
We now have all the ingredients required to prove eorem 1.3.
Proof of Theorem 1.3. Given a bipartite graph G = (X Û∪Y ,E), a maximum matching M in G
can be found using the classic algorithm of Hopcro and Karp (1973). Ramshaw and Tarjan (2012)
show that this algorithm runs within O(m√n) time. Given M , its maximal M-alternating sequence
can be found in linear time, yielding the partitions X = XS Û∪XL and Y = YS Û∪YL .
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Algorithm 1 Finding an envy-free matching of maximum cardinality
Input: A bipartite graph G := (X Û∪Y ,E).
Output: An envy-free matching of maximum cardinality in G.
1: Find a maximum-cardinality matching M in G.
2: Compute the M-alternating sequence S(M,X0) and the partitions X = XS Û∪XL, Y = YS Û∪YL .
3: Return the sub-matching M[XL,YL].
Lemma 2.2 shows that these partitions satisfy parts (a), (b) and (c) of eorem 1.3. Lemma 2.3
then shows that parts (d) and (e) are satised too.
It remains to prove that the partitions are unique. Consider alternative partitions X = X ′S Û∪X ′L
and Y = Y ′S Û∪Y ′L satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). Applying Lemma 2.3(d) to the partition
XS ,XL,YS ,YL implies that there is an envy-free matching in G saturating XL . Applying Lemma
2.3(e) to the partition X ′S ,X
′
L,Y
′
S ,Y
′
L implies that this matching must be contained in G[X ′L,Y ′L];
in particular, XL ⊆ X ′L . Analogous arguments imply that X ′L ⊆ XL . Hence X ′L = XL . Hence also
X ′S = XS . Since YS = NG (XS ) and Y ′S = NG (X ′S ), we also have Y ′S = YS . Hence also Y ′L = YL . 
We now apply eorem 1.3 to prove three conditions for existence of nonempty envy-free
matchings.
Proof of Corollary 1.4.
Part (a). Consider the unique partitions X = XS Û∪XL and Y = YS Û∪YL that exist by eorem 1.3.
Parts (d,e) of this theorem imply that G admits a nonempty envy-free matching i XL is nonempty.
Hence it is sucient to show that the graph (X Û∪NG (X ),E) is Y -path-saturated i XL is empty.
If XL is empty, then X = XS and NG (X ) = YS , so the graph (X Û∪NG (X ),E) is Y -path-saturated.
Conversely, suppose (X Û∪NG (X ),E) is Y -path-saturated, and dene X ′S := X and X ′L := ∅ and
Y ′S := NG (X ) and Y ′L := Y \ NG (X ). en, the partitions X = X ′S Û∪X ′L and Y = Y ′S Û∪Y ′L satisfy all
three properties (a,b,c) of eorem 1.3. e uniqueness of the partition implies that, in particular,
XL = X
′
L . Hence, XL is empty.
Part (b). IfG admits no matching saturating NG (X ), then (X ,NG (X )) cannot beY -path-saturated.
So by part (a), G admits a nonempty envy-free matching.
Part (c). If |NG (X )| ≥ |X | ≥ 1, then (X ,NG (X )) cannot be Y -path-saturated, since in any such
graph theX side is larger than theY side. By part (a),G admits a nonempty envy-free matching. 
3 ALGORITHMS FOR FINDING ENVY-FREE MATCHINGS
is section applies the structural results of the previous section to prove eorem 1.5.
3.1 Maximum cardinality
Proof of Theorem 1.5(a). We claim that Algorithm 1 nds a maximum-cardinality envy-free
matching. Indeed, by Lemmata 2.2 and 2.3, the matching M[XL,YL] is envy-free and saturates XL ,
and any other envy-free matching cannot saturate any vertex outside XL . Hence M[XL,YL] is an
envy-free matching of maximum cardinality in G. e run-time is dominated by step 1, which can
be done using the Hopcro-Karp algorithm within O(m√n) time (Ramshaw and Tarjan 2012). 
As an example, when Algorithm 1 runs on the graph of Figure 2, it returns an envy-free matching
of size 2, containing the two rightmost vertical edges.
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Algorithm 2 Finding envy-free matchings of minimum weight
Input: A bipartite graph G := (X Û∪Y ,E) and a function w : E → R≥0.
Output: An envy-free matching of minimum weight.
1: Let M be a matching of maximum cardinality in G.
2: Compute the M-alternating sequence S(M,X0) and the partitions X = XS Û∪XL, Y = YS Û∪YL .
3: Find and return a minimum-weight maximum-cardinality matching in G[XL,YL].
3.2 Minimum weight
In this subsection, the graph G := (X Û∪Y ,E) is endowed with an edge-weighting function w : E →
R≥0. e weight of a matching M ⊆ G is dened as w(M) := ∑e ∈M w(e). e goal is to nd a
matching that minimises w over all envy-free matchings of maximum cardinality in G.
Without the envy-freeness constraint, nding a minimum-cost maximum-cardinality matching
is known as the assignment problem. Since X and Y may be of dierent sizes, it is an unbalanced
assignment problem. Ramshaw and Tarjan (2012) provide a comprehensive survey of algorithms for
the unbalanced assignment problem. In particular, they show that the famous Hungarian method
can be generalised to unbalanced bipartite graphs, and its run-time is O(m · n + n2 logn).
Proof of Theorem 1.5(b). We claim that Algorithm 2 nds a maximum-cardinality envy-free
matching of minimum total weight. Indeed, by eorem 1.3, all envy-free matchings in G are
contained in the subgraphG[XL,YL], and all maximum-cardinality matchings inG[XL,YL] saturate
XL and are therefore envy-free. Hence, the Hungarian method on G[XL,YL] yields a maximum-
cardinality envy-free matching of minimum weight in G. Since |XL | ≤ |YL |, the run-time of the
Hungarian method is O(m · |XL | + |XL |2 log |XL |) which is in O(m · n + n2 logn). 
3.3 Maximum weight
Algorithm 2 can be modied to yield an envy-free matching of maximum total weight. e
unbalanced Hungarian method can be easily adapted to nd anX -saturating matching of maximum
weight (Ramshaw and Tarjan 2012). e following lemma shows that, in step 3, it is sucient to
consider the XL-saturating matchings.
Lemma 3.1. LetG := (X Û∪Y ,E) be an X -saturated bipartite graph. LetW be an envy-free matching
in G. en,W is contained in some X -saturating matching.
Proof. Let M be an X -saturating matching in G. For each vertex x ∈ X , denote by NM (x) the
vertex in Y matched to it by M . Let M ′ := {(x ,NM (x)) : x is unsaturated byW },
Envy-freeness of W implies that, for any vertex x ∈ X unsaturated by W , NM (x) must be
unsaturated byW too. Hence,W ∪M ′ is a matching. It saturates X and it containsW . 
Hence, by taking Algorithm 2 and replacing “minimum-weight” by “maximum-weight”, one
gets an algorithm for nding a maximum-weight envy-free matching. e proof is the same as of
eorem 1.5(b).
Remark 3.1. e above discussion assumes that the weightw(x ,y) represent the value of the pair-
ing (x ,y) to “society” as a whole (or to the social planner). erefore it appears in the maximisation
objective but not in the envy denition.
An alternative interpretation is that w(x ,y) represents the subjective value of y to x . is
interpretation leads to a dierent denition of envy-freeness. Given an edge-weight-function w
and a matching M , dene:
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w(x ,M) =
{
w(x ,y) If (x ,y) ∈ M
0 If x is unmatched by M
A matching M ⊆ E is called w-envy-free if, for every vertex x ∈ X and every matched vertex
y ′ ∈ YM : w(x ,M) ≥ w(x ,y ′), i.e, every agent in X weakly prefers his/her own house (if any) to any
house assigned to another agent. is denition reduces to Denition 1.1 when all edges have the
same weight.
e problem of nding a w-envy-free matching has been studied in parallel to the present work.
Gan et al. (2019) present a polynomial-time algorithm for nding a w-envy-free matching that
saturates all vertices of X , if and only if such a matching exists. Beynier et al. (2019) solve a similar
problem in a more complex seing in which the agents are located on a network, and each agent
only envies his/her neighbors in the network. In contrast to our work, these two works do not
consider partial matchings (matchings that do not saturate X ). erefore, the problem of nding a
w-envy-free (partial) matching of maximum cardinality and/or maximum weight is still open.
Remark 3.2. Irving et al. (2006) present an algorithm for nding a rank-maximal matching — a
matching that maximises the number of agents who are matched to their rst choice, then the
number of agents who are matched to their second choice, etc. A matching that is rank-maximal
among the set of all envy-free matchings can be found by an algorithm similar to Algorithm 2: in
the last step, instead of solving the unbalanced assignment problem, apply the algorithm of Irving
et al. (2006) to G[XL,YL].
4 RELATEDWORK AND APPLICATIONS
Concepts similar to envy-free matching appeared in previous papers related to fair division, but they
were “hidden” inside proofs of more specic algorithms. Our presentation of envy-free matching
as a stand-alone graph-theoretic concept allows us to both simplify old algorithms and design new
ones. is is illustrated below for two kinds of fair division problems: cake-cuing and indivisible
object allocation.
4.1 Envy-free matching in fair cake-cuing
As far as we know, the earliest concept similar to envy-free matching was presented by Kuhn
(1967)[unnumbered lemma, page 31]. Kuhn presents the lemma in matrix form. In graph terminol-
ogy, his lemma says that an envy-free matching exists whenever |X | = |Y | and there is a vertex
x ∈ X for whom NG ({x}) = |Y |. is is a special case of our Corollary 1.4(c). Kuhn uses this lemma
to extend an algorithm of Steinhaus (1948) for fair cake-cuing.
In a fair cake-cuing problem, there is a heterogeneous and continuous resource C (named
“the cake”), usually represented by the real interval [0, 1]. ere are n agents. Each agent i has a
nonatomic measureVi onC , representing the agent’s valuation of dierent parts ofC . A proportional
division ofC is a partition into n pieces,C = Z1 Û∪ · · · Û∪Zn , such that for all i ∈ [n] : Vi (Zi ) ≥ Vi (C)/n.
ere are various algorithms for proportional cake-cuing. One of them is now called the
Lone Divider algorithm. Steinhaus presented it for 3 agents. Kuhn (Kuhn 1967) extended it to an
arbitrary number of agents. e cases n = 3 and n = 4 are described in detail by Brams and Taylor
(1996)[pages 31-35], and the general case is described in detail by Robertson and Webb (1998)[pages
83-87]. Using envy-free matching, the Lone Divider algorithm can be presented in a much shorter
way; see Algorithm 3.
To show the correctness of Algorithm 3, it is required to show that in step 1, each agent a ∈ X
can indeed cut C into |X | pieces worth for it at least 1. Equivalently, we show that, in each arrival
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Algorithm 3 e Lone Divider algorithm for proportional cake-cuing. Based on Kuhn (1967).
Input: A cake C and a set X = [n] of agents with nonatomic measures (Vi )ni=1 on C . e measures
are normalized such that ∀i ∈ [n] : Vi (C) = n.
Output: A partition C = Z1 Û∪ · · · Û∪Zn such that ∀i ∈ [n] : Vi (Zi ) ≥ 1.
1: Let a ∈ X be the agent with the smallest index in X . ask a to cut C into |X | disjoint pieces,
(Cj )j ∈X , with Va(Cj ) ≥ 1 for all j ∈ X .
2: Dene a bipartite graph G with the agents of X on the one side and the |X | pieces on the other
side. Add an edge between agent i and piece Cj whenever Vi (Cj ) ≥ 1.
3: Using Algorithm 1, nd a maximum-cardinality envy-free matching in G. Give each matched
piece to its agent.
4: Remove the matched agents from X and the matched pieces from C .
5: If X , ∅, go back to step 1.
of the algorithm at step 1, Va(C) ≥ |X | for all a ∈ X . is is certainly true in the rst arrival, since
then |X | = n and Va(C) = n by the input assumptions. en:
• In step 1, Va(C) ≥ |X |, so for each piece Zi , Va(Zi ) ≥ 1.
• In step 2, agent a is adjacent to all |X | pieces, so |NG (X )| ≥ |X | holds.
• In step 3, by Corollary 1.4, a nonempty envy-free matching is found. Each matched agent
receives a piece with a value of at least 1, so the division is proportional for that agent.
• In step 4, let k ≥ 1 be the matching size. e k matched agents are removed from X , so
|X | decreases by k . e k matched pieces are removed from C , and by envy-freeness, each
remaining agent values each removed piece at less than 1, so the value of C decreases by
less than k . Hence, the claim still holds: for each agent a ∈ X : Va(C) ≥ |X |.
One may wonder why is the Lone Divider algorithm needed when there are many other algo-
rithms for proportional cake-cuing (Brams and Taylor 1996; Even and Paz 1984; Robertson and
Webb 1998; Steinhaus 1948)?
One reason is that Lone Divider can be modied to be not only fair but also symmetric. A
fair division algorithm is called symmetric if the value each agent receives depends only on the
valuations of the agents, and not on the order in which the algorithm processes them. In other
words, if we run the algorithm, permute the agents, and run the algorithm again, every agent
will have the same value in both runs. Most cake-cuing algorithms are not symmetric. For
example, in the Lone Divider algorithm, agent #1 (the divider) always receives exactly 1/n of the
total value, while other agents may get more than 1/n.4 is might make the agents quarrel over
who the divider will be. Selecting the divider by tossing a coin is not an acceptable solution, since
cake-cuing algorithms aspire for fairness ex-post and not just ex-ante (ex-ante fairness can be
aained trivially by giving the whole cake to an agent selected uniformly at random).
Manabe and Okamoto (2010) presented deterministic symmetric algorithms for two and three
agents. e case n ≥ 4 remained open until Che`ze (2018) presented a deterministic symmetric
algorithm for any number of agents. Che`ze mentions that the number of arithmetic operations
required by his algorithm may be exponential in n, and asks whether there exists a deterministic
symmetric algorithm in which the number of arithmetic operations required is polynomial in n.
We answer his question in the armative by combining his algorithm with our Algorithm 2 for
minimum-weight envy-free matching. e combined algorithm is shown as Algorithm 4.
4 It is assumed here that the agents answer the queries truthfully, based on their real value measure.
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Fig. 3. Bipartite agent-piece graph with weights determined by Algorithm 4.
The numbers below the pieces in Y and above the agents in X are their weights. Each piece has a unique
weight, while each agent has a weight that is a 1-to-1 function of its set of neighbors. The two lemost agents
have the same set of neighbors so they have the same weight (0); the two agents adjacent to them have the
same set of neighbors so they have the same weight (1); the rightmost agent has a dierent set of neighbors.
The numbers on the edges are their weights (due to space constraints, only some of weights are wrien).
Algorithm 4 A symmetric algorithm for proportional cake-cuing. Based on Che`ze (2018).
Input: A cake C = [0, 1], and a set X = [n] of agents with nonatomic measures (Vi )ni=1 on C . e
measures are normalized such that ∀i ∈ [n] : Vi (C) = n.
Output: A partition C = Z1 Û∪ · · · Û∪Zn such that ∀i ∈ [n] : Vi (Zi ) ≥ 1.
1: Ask each agent i ∈ X to make n − 1 marks, 0 < zi,1 < . . . < zi,n−1 < 1, which partition C into
n sub-intervals with a value of exactly 1 for i .
2: Choose the vector of marks that is smallest in lexicographic order. Cut C by these marks.
Denote the resulting pieces by C1, . . . ,Cn .
3: Dene a bipartite graph G with the agents of X on the one side and the pieces (denoted by Y )
on the other side. Add an edge (i,Cj ) whenever Vi (Cj ) ≥ 1.
4: Assign to each agent i ∈ X a weight w(i) ∈ {0, . . . ,n − 1} that is a function of the set of
neighbors NG (i), such that two agents i, i ′ ∈ X have the same weight i NG (i) = NG (i ′).
5: Assign to each piece Cj ∈ Y a unique weight w(Cj ) ∈ {0, . . . ,n − 1}, such that the weight of
the lemost piece (adjacent to 0) is 0, the weight of the next-lemost piece is 1, etc.
6: Assign to each edge (i,Cj ) ∈ E the weight w(i,Cj ) := 2n ·w (i)+w (Cj ). Using Algorithm 2, nd a
minimum-weight maximum-cardinality envy-free matching M in G.
7: Let XY ⊆ X be the set of all agents that are adjacent to all pieces in Y (i.e., the agents i ∈ X
with NG (i) = Y ). Give each agent in XY an arbitrary piece from NM (XY ).
8: Let XR := XM \ XY . Partition XR into subsets of agents with the same weight. I.e., for some
k ≥ 1, nd a partition XR = X1 Û∪ · · · Û∪Xk , where for all j ∈ [k], for all i, i ′ ∈ X j , w(i) = w(i ′).
9: For all j ∈ [k], recursively divide the union of pieces in NM (X j ) among the agents in X j .
10: Recursively divide the union of pieces in Y \ YM among the agents in X \ XM .
e rst change from Lone Divider is that the initial partition should be decided in a way that
depends only on the valuations. is is done in step 2 using lexicographic ordering. For example, if
Alice cuts the cake at 0.3, 0.7, Bob cuts at 0.4, 0.6 and Carl at 0.2, 0.6, then the initial partition is
Carl’s partition, so C1 = [0, 0.2] and C2 = [0.2, 0.6] and C3 = [0.6, 1].
e second change is in steps 4–6. Since there may be many dierent envy-free matchings,
one of them must be selected in a way that depends only on the valuations. One way to select a
unique envy-free matching is to assign to each edge, a weight that is a unique power of two. is
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guarantees that each subset of edges has a unique weight, so there is a unique minimum-weight
maximum-cardinality envy-free matching. However, symmetry requires that the edge weights
themselves should depend only on the valuations. erefore, edges may have dierent weights
only if they are adjacent to dierent pieces (since the pieces depend only on the valuations), or to
agents with dierent valuations. is motivates the weighting scheme in steps 4–6. An example of
a graph with some edge weights is shown in Figure 3.
In the special case that each agent has a unique set of neighbors, the agent weights are unique,
the edge weights are unique powers of two, each matching has a unique weight, and thus the
minimum-weight envy-free matching M found in step 6 is uniquely determined by the valuations.
In this special case, the algorithm can just proceed as in Algorithm 3: give each piece in YM to
the agent matched to it in XM , and recursively divide the remaining cake — the union of pieces in
Y \ YM — among the remaining agents in X \ XM .
In the general case, there may be several dierent minimum-weight envy-free matchings, and
step 6 returns one of them, in a way that may depend on the agents’ order. erefore, to preserve
symmetry, care must be taken to ensure that the agents’ values are not sensitive to the minimum-
weight matching selected. Note that all these minimum-weight matchings have the same set XM of
matched agents — it is exactly the set XL dened by the unique partition of eorem 1.3. Moreover,
by the determination of edge weights, all these matchings have the same set YM of matched pieces.
So the sets XM and YM are uniquely determined by the valuations; only the pairing of agents in
XM with pieces in YM is not uniquely determined and must be handled in the following steps.
Consider rst the set XY dened in step 7. Note that it contains at least one agent — the agent
responsible to the lexicographically-smallest partition selected in step 2 (in Figure 3, the set XY
contains the two agents with weight 1). By envy-freeness of M , all agents in XY are matched by M .
By the determination of edge weights, all minimum-weight envy-free matchings M ′ in G have the
same set NM ′(XY ), i.e., in all these matchings, the same pieces are allocated to the agents in XY .
Since all agents in XY value all pieces in Y at exactly 1, it is possible to give each agent in XY an
arbitrary piece in NM (XY ), for example, based on the agents’ indices. is arbitrary choice does
not aect the value of any agent; all agents in XY are treated symmetrically.
Consider now the sets X1, . . . ,Xk dened in step 8 (in Figure 3 there are two such sets: the set
X1 contains the two lemost agents whose weight is 0, and the set X2 contains the rightmost agent
whose weight is 2). For each j ∈ [k], all agents in X j have the same weight, so they have the same
set of neighbors. Hence, by envy-freeness of M , if one agent in a set X j is matched by M , then all
agents inX j must be matched by M too. By the determination of edge weights, all minimum-weight
envy-free matchings M ′ in G have the same set NM ′(X j ), i.e., in all these matchings, the same
pieces are allocated to the agents in X j . Here, it is not possible to give each agent in X j an arbitrary
piece in NM (X j ), since each agent in X j may value the pieces in NM (X j ) dierently. However, by
denition of the graph G, all agents in X j value each piece in NM (X j ) at least 1, so they value
the union of NM (X j ) at least |X j |. erefore, by recursively dividing the union of NM (X j ) among
the agents in X j , each agent in X j is guaranteed a value of at least 1. All agents in X j are treated
symmetrically.
Finally, step 10 of Algorithm 4 is analogous to step 5 of Algorithm 3: by envy-freeness of M , the
agents in X \ XM value each piece given away at less than 1, so they value the remaining cake at
more than |X \ XM |, so the recursive call gives each of them a value of at least 1.
From the above discussion, it follows that Algorithm 4 is symmetric, it runs in polynomial time,
and it nds a proportional cake-allocation, as claimed in eorem 1.6.
Another application of envy-free matching was recently found in a generalisation of cake-cuing
called multi-cake cuing. In this problem, the cake is made of m pairwise-disjoint sub-cakes
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(“islands”), and each agent should be given a piece that overlaps at most k islands, for some xed
integer k ≥ 1. When k < m, it may be impossible to guarantee to each agent 1/n of the total
value. A natural question is what value can be guaranteed, as a function of k,m,n. Segal-Halevi
(2018) shows an upper bound of min( 1n , km+n−1 ), as well as several special cases in which this upper
bound can be aained. One of these special cases is the case k = 2. e algorithm for this case uses
envy-free matching; see there for details.
4.2 Envy-free matching in fair allocation of discrete objects
In Procaccia and Wang (2014)[subsection 3.1], another concept similar to envy-free matching can
be found hiding inside proofs of other lemmata related to fair allocation of discrete objects.5
In a fair object allocation problem, there is a nite set O of objects. ere are n agents. Each
agent i has a value measure (i.e, an additive function) Vi : 2O → R+. Since the objects are discrete,
a proportional allocation might not exist. Hence, the following relaxation is used. For every agent
i ∈ [n] and integers 1 ≤ l ≤ d , dene the l-out-of-d maximin-share of i from O , denoted Mi
(
l
dO
)
,
as follows:
Mi
(
l
d
O
)
:= max
P∈Partitions(O,d )
min
Z ∈Union(P,l )
Vi (Z )
where the maximum is over all partitions of O into d subsets, and the minimum is over all unions
of l subsets from the partition. Informally, Mi
(
l
dO
)
is the largest value that agent i can get by
partitioningO into d piles and geing the worst l piles. Obviously Mi
(
l
dO
)
≤ ldVi (O), and equality
holds i O can be partitioned into d subsets with the same value. us, Mi
(
l
dO
)
can be thought of
as ldVi (O) “rounded down to the nearest object”.
e maximin share with l = 1 was introduced by Budish (2011). e generalisation to arbitrary
l ≥ 1 was done by Babaio et al. (2017).6 Budish (2011) asked whether there always exists a partition
of O in which the value of each agent i is at least Mi
( 1
nO
)
. For n = 2, the answer is positive and
such an allocation is easily found:
• Alice partitions O into two piles that she values as at least MA
( 1
2O
)
(in other words, she
nds a partition P aaining the maximum in the denition of MA
( 1
2O
)
). 7
• Bob chooses the pile he prefers and Alice receives the other pile.
For n ≥ 3, Procaccia and Wang (2014) and Kurokawa et al. (2018) prove that such allocation might
not exist. ey present a multiplicative approximation algorithm, by which each agent i receives
a bundle whose value is at least γ · Mi
( 1
nO
)
, for some fraction γ ∈ (0, 1). eir approximation
fraction γ equals 3/4 for n ∈ {3, 4}, and approaches 2/3 when n →∞.
ey then discuss an additive approximation — a partition in which the value of each agent i is
at least Mi
( 1
n+1O
)
. ey say that
5 is paper has a journal version (Kurokawa et al. 2018) where these lemmata do not appear.
6While the MMS relaxation yields very interesting combinatorial problems, its practical usefulness as a fair division criterion
can be challenged. See Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi, 2019.
7To nd this maximising partition, Alice has to solve the NP-complete problem Partition. We assume a query model in
which agents can answer any query about their individual valuation function in constant time, and the challenge is to
compute a fair allocation given the agents’ replies.
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“We have designed an algorithm that achieves this guarantee for the case of three
players (it is already nontrivial). Proving or disproving the existence of such
allocations for a general number of players remains an open problem.”
ey do not present the algorithm for n = 3. 8 Below we present a slightly more general algorithm
using envy-free matching. Algorithm 5 guarantees to each agent i a value of at least Mi
( 1
2n−2O
)
,
which for n = 3 coincides with Mi
( 1
n+1O
)
.
Algorithm 5 Find a 1-out-of-(2n − 2) maximin-share allocation among n agents.
Input: A set O of objects and a set X := [n] of agents (n ≥ 2) with measures (Vi )ni=1 on O . e
measures are normalized so that ∀i ∈ [n] : Mi ( 12n−2O ) = 1.
Output: A partition O = Z1 Û∪ . . . Û∪Zn such that ∀i ∈ [n] : Vi (Zi ) ≥ 1.
1: Arbitrarily pick one agent a ∈ X , and have it divide O into |X | disjoint bundles (O j )j ∈X with
Va(O j ) ≥ 1 for all j ∈ X .
2: Dene a bipartite graph G with the agents of X in one side, the |X | bundles in the other side,
and agent i ∈ X is adjacent to bundle O j i Vi (O j ) ≥ 1.
3: Find a maximum-cardinality envy-free matching in G . Give each matched bundle to its agent.
4: Remove the matched agents from X and the matched bundles from O .
5: If X , ∅, go back to step 1.
e algorithm starts with a normalisation step. It requires that, before the normalisation,
Mi
( 1
2n−2O
)
> 0 for all i ∈ [n]. is does not restrict generality since, if for some i ∈ [n] :
Mi
( 1
2n−2O
)
= 0, this i can be given an empty bundle and the algorithm can be applied to the
remaining agents.
To prove the correctness of Algorithm 5, the following combinatorial lemma is needed.
Lemma 4.1. Let (vj )nj=1 and (sj )nj=1 and (dj )nj=1 be real numbers such that for all j ∈ [n]: vj ≥ 1 and
sj ∈ [0,vj ] and dj = vj − sj (d is the sequence of dierences between v and s).
If
∑n
j=1 sj ≤ k , then the sequence of dierences can be partitioned into d(n −k)/2e subsets, such that
the sum of each set is at least 1.
Proof. 9 For each j ∈ [n], dene tj := dj/vj = 1 − sj/vj . So for all j ∈ [n] : tj ∈ [0, 1], and∑n
j=1 tj = n −
∑n
j=1 sj/vj ≥ n −
∑n
j=1 sj ≥ n − k .
Collect the tj sequentially into subsets, starting with t1, until the sum of the current subset is at
least one. Continue creating subsets in this way until all the tj -s are arranged in subsets. Letm + 1
be the number of created subsets, where the sum of the rstm subsets is at least 1 and the sum of
the last subset (which may be empty) is less than 1. Note that the sum of each of the rstm subsets
is less than 2. erefore, the sum of all subsets is less than 2m + 1. On the other hand, the sum of
all tj is at least n − k . Hence 2m + 1 > n − k so 2m ≥ n − k som ≥ d(n − k)/2e.
In each subset there are tj whose sum is at least 1. e corresponding dj are at least as large, so
their sum is at least 1 too. 
Proof of Theorem 1.7. We claim that Algorithm 5 nds a 1-of-(2n − 2)-MMS allocation.
e proof is similar to the correctness proof of the Lone Divider algorithm. It is required to
prove that in step 1, each agent a ∈ X can indeed partition O into |X | bundles worth for it at least
1. Indeed, in the rst time the algorithm arrives at step 1, |X | = n. By denition of the maximin
8Perhaps they wanted to write it in the margin but the margin was too narrow ©
9 We are grateful to user bof of MathOverow.com for the proof idea: hps://mathoverow.net/a/334754/34461
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share, each agent in X can partition O into 2n − 2 ≥ n piles with a value of at least Mi
( 1
2n−2O
)
, so
the claim is true by the input assumptions.
en, the algorithm proceeds as follows.
In Step 1, by the claim, the Va of each bundle is at least 1.
In Step 2, agent a is adjacent to all |X | bundles, so |NG (X )| ≥ |X | ≥ 1.
In Step 3, by eorem 1.4, a nonempty envy-free matching is found. Each matched agent receives
a bundle with a value of at least 1, so the output requirement holds for these agents.
In Step 4, the objects in the matched bundles are removed from O . By envy-freeness, each
remaining agent values each matched bundle at less than 1. Let k be the total number of agents
matched since the beginning of the algorithm. So |X | = n − k , and for each agent remaining in X ,
the total value of objects removed so far is less than k .
Initially, each agent could partition O into 2n − 2 piles with a value of at least 1. Now, some
objects were taken from some of these piles, so their value may be less than 1. We now show that
each agent can re-partition his/her piles into n − k bundles, such that the value of each bundle is
at least 1. We apply Lemma 4.1 where the numbers (vj )2n−2j=1 are the agent’s values to the 2n − 2
original piles, and the numbers (sj )2n−2j=1 are the values of objects removed from each pile j. e
lemma implies that the agent can partition the remaining piles into bundles with a value of at least
1, and the number of such bundles is at least d(2n − 2 − k)/2e = (n − 1) − bk/2c ≥ n − k , so the
claim still holds when the algorithm goes back to step 1. 
Algorithm 5 can be modied as to provide various other fairness guarantees (see Appendix A).
For example, it can guarantee 2-out-of-(3n − 2)MMS-fairness. For some agents, this guarantee may
be beer than 1-out-of-(2n − 2) MMS. For example, with n = 3, if O contains 7 objects and agent i
values all of them at 1, then Mi
( 2
7O
)
= 2 while Mi
( 1
4O
)
= 1.
More generally, for every integer l ≥ 2, it is possible to guarantee to each agent i at least his
(l − 1)-out-of-(ln − 2) maximin share, i.e., Vi (Zi ) ≥ Mi
(
l−1
ln−2O
)
.
e algorithm can also guarantee a multiplicative approximation, giving each agent i ∈ [n]
a value of at least 23Mi
( 1
nO
)
. e main challenge in proving all these variants is to prove the
appropriate analogue of Lemma 4.1; see Appendix A for details.
Algorithm 5 can even make dierent guarantees to dierent agents. e only required change is
that in step 2, in the bipartite graph, each agent i should be adjacent to pile O j i Vi (O j ) is above
the fairness threshold chosen by agent i .
While there are now algorithms that aain beer multiplicative approximation factors (see e.g.
Barman and Krishna Murthy (2017); Ghodsi et al. (2018)), it is useful to have a simple algorithm
using envy-free matching that allows each agent to choose between a multiplicative and various
additive approximations.
We were unable to adapt Algorithm 5 to nd a 1-out-of-(n + 1)MMS allocation for n ≥ 4; this
problem remains open.
4.3 A note on terminology
e term envy-free matching is used, in a somewhat more specic sense, in the context of markets,
both with and without money.
In a market with money, there are several buyers and several goods, and each good may have a
price. Given a price-vector, an “envy-free matching” is an allocation of bundles to agents in which
each agent weakly prefers his bundle over all other bundles, given their respective prices. is is a
relaxation of a Walrasian equilibrium. A Walrasian equilibrium is an envy-free matching in which
every item with a positive price is allocated to some agent. In a Walrasian equilibrium, the seller’s
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revenue might be low. is motivates its relaxation to envy-free matching, in which the seller may
set reserve-prices (and leave some items with positive price unallocated) in order to increase his
expected revenue. See, for example, Alaei et al. (2012); ?.
In a market without money, there are several people who should be assigned to positions. For
example, several doctors have to be matched for residency in hospitals. Each doctor has a preference-
relation on hospitals (ranking the hospitals from best to worst), and each hospital has a preference
relation on doctors. Each doctor can work in at most one hospital, and each hospital can employ
at most a xed number of doctors (called the capacity of the hospital). A matching has justied
envy if there is a doctor d and a hospital h, such that d prefers h over his current employer, and
h prefers d over one of its current employees. An “envy-free matching” is a matching with no
justied envy. is is a relaxation of a stable matching. A stable matching is an envy-free matching
which is also non-wasteful — there is no doctor d and a hospital h, such that d prefers h over his
current employer and h has some vacant positions (Wu and Roth 2018). When the hospitals have,
in addition to upper quotas (capacities), also lower quotas, a stable matching might not exist. is
motivates its relaxation to envy-free matching, which always exists and can be found eciently
(Yokoi 2017).
We present envy-free matching as a general graph-theoretic concept, in order to facilitate its use
as a subroutine in various seings.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
5.1 Star matchings
e envy-freeness concept can be generalised from a matching (a set of vertex-disjoint edges) to
an r -star matching — a set of vertex-disjoint copies of the the star K1,r , where the star center is in
X and the star leaves are in Y . An envy-free r -star matching is then an r -star matching in which
every vertex in X that is not matched (as a center), is disconnected from any vertex in Y that is
matched (as a leaf). Our results can be easily generalised to r -star matchings. For example, the
following theorem generalises eorem 1.5(a) and Corollary 1.4(c).
Theorem 5.1. (a) ere is a polynomial-time algorithm that, given any bipartite graph G =
(X Û∪Y ,E), nds a maximum-size r -star envy-free matching in G.
(b) If |NG (X )| ≥ r |X | ≥ 1, then G contains a nonempty envy-free r -star matching.
Proof. Given G, construct an auxiliary bipartite graph G ′ := (X ′ Û∪Y ,E ′), where X ′ is aained
from X by creating r duplicates of every vertex in X , and E ′ is aained from E by creating an edge
from each copy vx of x ∈ X to every vertex y ∈ NG (x). For x ∈ X , let vx1 , . . . ,vxr denote the r
copies of x in X ′. ere is a correspondence between envy-free matchings in G ′ and envy-free
r -star matchings in G:
(1) Consider any envy-free matchingW ′ in G ′. e subgraph G ′[{vx1 , . . . ,vxr },NG (x)] forms a
complete bipartite graph. Hence, if (vxi ,y) ∈W ′ for some i ∈ [r ], thenW ′ being envy-free in G ′
means thatW ′ must saturate all of {vx1 , . . . ,vxr }. All these vertices can only be saturated byW ′
using edges with one end in NG (x); all edges thus used byW ′ (in G ′) correspond to dierent edges
in G whose one end is x (the ends in Y are distinct). Collapsing every set {vx1 , . . . ,vxr } saturated by
W ′ back to its origin x in G gives an envy-free r -star matching in G.
(2) Given an envy-free r -star matchingW in G, create a matchingW ′ in G ′ by connecting, for
each saturated vertex x ∈ X , each duplicate vxi of x to one of the r vertices in Y matched to x in
W . Note that, for each saturated vertex x ∈ X , there are r ! ways to connect the duplicates of x to
its neighbors, so there are many dierent matchingsW ′ corresponding toW . However, all such
matchings have the same cardinality, and every such matching is envy-free in G ′: for every vertex
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x that is matched byW , all its duplicates are matched byW ′ and thus are not envious; for every
vertex x that is unmatched byW , all its duplicates are not adjacent to any matched vertex in Y ,
and thus are not envious either.
is correspondence implies the claims.
(a) e size (number of edges) of the matchingsW ′ in G ′ is exactly r times the size (number of
stars) of the matchingW in G. Hence, applying Algorithm 1 to G ′ yields a maximum-cardinality
r -star matching in G.
(b) If |NG (X )| ≥ r |X | ≥ 1, then |NG′(X ′)| ≥ |X ′ | ≥ r ≥ 1, so G ′ satises the premise of Corollary
1.4 and thus admits a nonempty envy-free matching W ′. It corresponds to an envy-free r -star
matchingW in G. 
Remark 5.1. In an r -star matching, each vertex in X is matched to either zero or exactly r vertices
in Y . One can also consider allocation problems in which each vertex in X can be connected to any
number of vertices in Y (but each vertex in Y can still be connected to at most one vertex in X ). In
this seing, a vertex x1 ∈ X envies another vertex x2 ∈ X i there are more vertices matched to x2
that are adjacaent to x1, then vertices matched to x1. Finding a maximum-cardinality envy-free
allocation in this seing is a question for future work.
5.2 Symmetric envy and non-bipartite graphs
Our denition of an envy-free matching is asymmetric in that it considers the envy of vertices in
X only. One can dene a matching as symmetric-envy-free if any unmatched vertex in G is not
adjacent to any matched vertex in G. is denition extends naturally to non-bipartite graphs.
With this symmetric denition, the algorithmic problems studied here become much easier. It is
easy to show that a connected graph admits a symmetric-envy-free matching if and only if it admits
a perfect matching. en, an arbitrary graph admits a nonempty symmetric-envy-free matching if
and only if it has a connected component admiing a perfect matching. A maximum cardinality
(minimum weight) symmetric-envy-free matching is just the union of all perfect matchings (of
minimum weight) of such connected components.
5.3 Other potential extensions
(1) Since nonempty envy-free matchings might not exist, one may be interested in relaxations.
For example, given a real α > 0, a matching M is called α-fraction envy-free if for every
unmatched x ∈ X \ XM : |NG (x) ∩ YM | ≤ α |NG (x)|. at is, agents unsaturated by M are
willing to “tolerate” at most an α-fraction of their acceptable houses being assigned to
someone else. Alternatively, given an integer c ≥ 0, M is called c-additive envy-free if for
every unmatched x ∈ X \ XM : |NG (x) ∩ YM | ≤ c .
(2) From a probabilistic perspective, it may be interesting to calculate the probability that a
nonempty envy-free matching exists in a random graph. is is related to the problem
of calculating the probability that an envy-free allocation exists, which has recently been
studied by e.g. Dickerson et al. (2014) and Manurangsi and Suksompong (2018).
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A VARIANTS OF MAXIMIN SHARE FAIRNESS
is appendix presents variants of Algorithm 5 that aain dierent fairness conditions.
Algorithm 6 Find an (l − 1)-out-of-(ln − 2)MMS allocation among n agents.
Input: An integer parameter l ≥ 2, a set O of objects, and a set X = [n] of agents (n ≥ 2) with
measures (Vi )ni=1 on O . e measures are normalized such that ∀i ∈ [n] : Mi
( 1
ln−2O
)
= 1. e
measures are normalized such that ∀i ∈ [n] : Mi ( 1ln−2O ) = 1.
Output: A partition O = Z1 Û∪ . . . Û∪Zn such that ∀i ∈ [n] : Vi (Zi ) ≥ l − 1.
1: Pick arbitrarily one agent a ∈ X , and ask her to divide O into |X | disjoint bundles (O j )j ∈X with
Va(O j ) ≥ l − 1 for all j ∈ X .
2: Create a bipartite graph G with the agents of X in one side, the |X | bundles in the other side,
and agent i ∈ X is adjacent to bundle O j i Vi (O j ) ≥ l − 1.
3: Find a maximum-cardinality envy-free matching inG . Give each matched bundle to its matched
agent.
4: Remove the matched agents from X and the matched objects from O .
5: If X , ∅, go back to step 1.
Algorithm 6 provides a generalised additive approximation. Its correctness proof is similar to
Algorithm 5, with Lemma 4.1 replaced by the following:
Lemma A.1. Let (vj )nj=1 and (sj )nj=1 and (dj )nj=1 be real numbers such that for all j ∈ [n]: vj ≥ 1
and sj ∈ [0,vj ] and dj = vj − sj (d is the sequence of dierences between v and s).
If
∑n
j=1 sj ≤ (l − 1) · k , then the sequence of dierences can be partitioned into b(n − (l − 1)k + 1)/lc
subsets, such that the sum of each set is at least l − 1.
Proof. 10 For each j ∈ [n], dene tj := dj/vj = 1 − sj/vj . So for all j ∈ [n] : tj ∈ [0, 1], and∑n
j=1 tj = n −
∑n
j=1 sj/vj ≥ n −
∑n
j=1 sj ≥ n − (l − 1)k .
Group the tj sequentially, starting with t1, until the sum of the current group is at least l − 1.
Continue creating groups in this way until all the tj -s are arranged in groups. Let m + 1 be the
number of created groups, where the sum of the rstm groups is at least l − 1 and the sum of the
last group (which may be empty) is less than l − 1. Note that the sum of each of the rstm groups
is less than l , erefore, the sum of all groups is less than lm + l − 1. On the other hand, the sum
of all tj is at least n − (l − 1)k . Hence: lm + (l − 1) > n − (l − 1)k so lm > n − (l − 1)k + 1 − l so
m > b(n − (l − 1)k + 1)/lc − 1 som ≥ b(n − (l − 1)k + 1)/lc.
In each group there are tj whose sum is at least l − 1. e corresponding dj are at least as large,
so their sum is at least l − 1 too. 
Initially, each agent can partition O into ln − 2 piles with a value of at least 1. At step 4, for
each remaining agent, the value of each bundle given away to another agent is less than (l − 1). So
aer k agents are matched, the value of all removed objects is less than (l − 1)k . By Lemma A.1,
the agent can re-group their ln − 2 piles to bundles of value at least l − 1, and the number of such
bundles is at least b(ln − 2 − (l − 1)k + 1)/lc ≥ n − d (l−1)k+1l e ≥ n − k . From here, the proof is the
same as the proof of Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 7 provides a multiplicative approximation. Its correctness proof is similar to Algorithm
5, with Lemma 4.1 replaced by the following:
10 We are grateful to user bof of MathOverow.com for the proof idea: hps://mathoverow.net/a/334754/34461
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Algorithm 7 Find a 2/3-fraction 1-out-of-n MMS allocation among n agents.
Input: A set O of objects and a set X = [n] of agents (n ≥ 2) with measures (Vi )ni=1 on O . e
measures are normalized such that ∀i ∈ [n] : Mi ( 1nO ) = 1.
Output: A partition O = Z1 Û∪ . . . Û∪Zn such that ∀i ∈ [n] : Vi (Zi ) ≥ 2/3.
1: Pick arbitrarily one agent a ∈ X , and ask her to divide O into |X | disjoint bundles (O j )j ∈X with
Va(O j ) ≥ 2/3 for all j ∈ X .
2: Create a bipartite graph G with the agents of X in one side, the |X | bundles in the other side,
and agent i ∈ X is adjacent to bundle O j i Vi (O j ) ≥ 2/3.
3: Find a maximum-cardinality envy-free matching inG . Give each matched bundle to its matched
agent.
4: Remove the matched agents from X and the matched objects from O .
5: If X , ∅, go back to step 1.
Lemma A.2. Let (vj )nj=1 and (sj )nj=1 and (dj )nj=1 be real numbers such that for all j ∈ [n]: vj ≥ 1
and sj ∈ [0,vj ] and dj = vj − sj (d is the sequence of dierences between v and s).
If
∑n
j=1 sj ≤ 2k/3, then the sequence of dierences can be partitioned into n − k subsets, such that
the sum of each set is at least 2/3.
Proof. Dene:
• t0 — the number of j such that sj/vj ∈ [0, 1/3].
• t1 — the number of j such that sj/vj ∈ (1/3, 2/3].
• t2 — the number of j such that sj/vj ∈ (2/3, 1].
We have:
t0 + t1 + t2 = n
(1/3)t1 + (2/3)t2 <
n∑
j=1
sj/vj ≤
n∑
j=1
sj ≤ 2k/3
=⇒ t1 + 2t2 < 2k
=⇒ t1 > 2n − 2k − 2t0
Now, t0 remaining numbers are at least 2/3. Moreover, t1 remaining numbers are at least 1/3.
Since t1 ≥ 2n − 2k − 2t0, these numbers can be paired into at least n − k − t0 pairs with sum at least
2/3. All in all, we have at least n − k sets with sum at least 2/3. 
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